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THE MINUTEMAN MISSILE NHS: A MONUMENT TO AMERICAN HEGEMONY PART 2

Cassie Sipe

Sep 18, 2024

Read part 1 of this series here




While the Minuteman Missile National Historic Site discusses various Cold War treaties over the decades, it leaves out how these agreements have unraveled in recent years, giving visitors the false impression that the dangers of nuclear war are a thing of the past.


The Minuteman Missile I program was fast-tracked following the USSR's successful Sputnik launch in 1957. Though the program was already in the works, Sputnik underscored the urgent need for faster, more advanced ICBMs, leading to the first Minuteman Missile test in 1961.


The Minuteman Missile II program operated for nearly 30 years, until the 44th Missile Wing was deactivated in 1994 under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The supposed peace these treaties symbolize is deceptive, as the U.S. has never halted its nuclear arms race. The shutdown of these missile sites was little more than a footnote in its continuing global terror campaign.


The U.S. military recently conducted two tests of Minuteman III ICBMs from Vandenberg Space Force Base. Despite being operational since the 1970s, these missiles are still in use across five states due to delays and budget problems with the Sentinel replacement program. The first Sentinel test flight is now projected for February 2026. Admiral Charles Richard of U.S. Strategic Command noted in 2021 that the Minuteman III’s service life cannot be extended much longer due to outdated designs and obsolete technical support.


Russia has warned it would respond if the U.S. persists with these tests. This warning comes after a U.S. Department of Energy test in Las Vegas involving chemical explosives and radiotracers aimed at improving the detection of underground nuclear tests. Russia last tested an ABM missile in December 2022.

A Nuclear Program of Capitalism in Decay


The U.S. is facing challenges in sustaining and modernizing its ICBM program due to funding disagreements and internal administrative issues. Colonel Charles Chegg was recently dismissed from the LGM-35A Sentinel program over a "loss of confidence" linked to procedural matters. The program’s costs have ballooned from $95 billion to $131 billion, and testing is now delayed until 2026. Efforts to update the missile systems are years behind schedule.


For example, the Sentinel ICBM program, meant to replace the aging Minuteman III missiles, involves modernizing 450 silos and command centers. The costs are expected to be significantly higher than first projected, and delays could extend as long as five years. Congress has approved budget amendments for 2025 to allow for nuclear upgrades to the B-52 bomber.



Failed Past Treaties and the Dim Future of Arms Control


Former Kremlin advisor Dmitry Stefanovich points out that Russia feels obligated to develop intermediate-range missiles because of U.S. plans to deploy similar weapons, following the collapse of the INF Treaty. He expects to see the deployment of new systems, including ground-launched Kalibr and Zircon missiles, and possibly enhanced Iskander missiles. U.S. missile placements during exercises in Denmark and the Philippines have raised concerns, as President Putin has noted. While Russia currently has no plans to deploy INF missiles, this stance could shift if the U.S. moves ahead with its plans to deploy such missiles in Germany by 2026. Putin has called for the production of these banned missiles in response to the U.S.'s actions.


In 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken remarked that "the United States has assessed the Russian Federation to be in compliance with its New START Treaty obligations every year since the treaty came into effect in 2011." Still, Russia has accused the U.S. since 2018 of "converting a certain number of Trident II SLBM launchers and B-52H heavy bombers in a manner that prevents the Russian Federation from verifying that these strategic arms have been rendered incapable of deploying SLBMs or nuclear weapons on heavy bombers." Russia argues that these actions undermine the spirit of the treaty.


In response to NATO's support for Ukraine, Russia suspended its participation in the New START Treaty, the last standing nuclear arms control agreement between the two nations. This move follows U.S. withdrawals from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, the INF Treaty in 2019, and the Open Skies Treaty in 2020. Russia’s deepening distrust of Washington stems from concerns about U.S. adherence to these treaties and its backing of Ukraine.


Scott Ritter has pointed out that the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty in 2020 and its refusal to grant Russia access to U.S. military installations eroded Russia's confidence in the agreement, leading to Russia’s withdrawal in 2021. Though Russia initially planned to remain in the treaty, concerns grew over reports that NATO allies were pressured by the U.S. to share imagery of Russian facilities, violating the treaty’s mandate that data be used only for treaty purposes.


In 2023, the Russian Duma began withdrawing from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). While the U.S. signed the CTBT in 1996, it never ratified it. Before this, the U.S., USSR, and UK collaborated on arms control through the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963, officially known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which aimed to slow the nuclear arms race by banning all tests except those conducted underground.


The U.S. and its allies also never ratified the 1999 Adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, preventing it from becoming legally binding. The CFE, signed in 1990, was suspended by Russia in 2007 after NATO refused to ratify the treaty following Russia's intervention in Georgia. Russia formally withdrew from the treaty in 2023, citing Finland's NATO membership, Sweden's application, and the U.S.’s refusal to provide necessary information. Belarus, the U.S., and NATO nations also suspended participation last year.


Diminishing Role of MAD and Arms Control


During the Cold War, the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) nearly triggered nuclear conflict on multiple occasions, though sound judgment prevailed. For instance, Soviet officer Stanislav Petrov chose not to report what seemed to be an incoming U.S. missile attack, correctly identifying it as a system error and thereby averting nuclear war. Incidents like these highlight the critical role arms control agreements and Cold War-era treaties played in preserving global stability, providing lessons that remain relevant today.


The START I treaty, signed by Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George H.W. Bush, was a key step in arms control, requiring the destruction of 450 Minuteman II missiles, along with equivalent Soviet reductions. Yet the impact of these treaties has faded, with New START, the last surviving agreement, set to expire in 2026.


In terms of nuclear doctrine, both sides currently forbid preemptive strikes. Yet, Sergey Karaganov, a former Kremlin advisor, has argued that Russia’s nuclear doctrine is outdated and should be revised to provide a more credible deterrent. He believes the current policy, established in 2020, is overly restrictive and ineffective, and he advocates for the inclusion of a first-strike response to any major attack.



Dangerous Lies at the Minuteman Missile NHS


Rather than focusing on peace or the real dangers of arms control between the U.S. and Russia, the Minuteman Missile NHS glorifies the U.S.'s dominance over the USSR. The site does cover the history of Minuteman missiles, Cold War treaties, and the dissolution of the USSR, but it fails to address the broader consequences of arms control failures. With the New START Treaty in jeopardy and other key agreements falling apart, the NHS overlooks the ever-present threat of nuclear war, which is now at its highest level since the Cold War.


In closing, the Minuteman Missile NHS sidesteps the implications of failed treaties while continuing to promote the narrative of American exceptionalism. This story seeks to justify both past and current acts of aggression in the name of "freedom" and "security." Accepting this narrative without question risks reinforcing the same forces of imperialism that continue to oppress millions around the world. We must challenge these falsehoods and tell history from the viewpoint of the oppressed, not the oppressors.

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